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Abstract 
The abuse of incumbency during elections in order to retain power by ruling governments has become a 
contentious issue in political economics. This study was set to examine the effect elections and other 
macroeconomic variables on growth in Ghana. Data for the estimation was collected for the period, 1992-2010, 
during which Ghana has had an uninterrupted democratic elections. The results of the analysis show that political 
cycles do not exist in Ghana, which lends support to the views of (Ito and Park, 1999; Alesina et al, 1992, 1993; 
Brender and Drazen, 2005). Nonetheless, pre-election manipulations of some sort is a common phenomenon as 
its manifestation becomes glare as abuse of incumbency is noticed even though data do not suggest so. The 
implication is that abuse of incumbency may exist but not to the extent that creates political cycles.  
Keywords: Political Cycles, opportunistic Models, Partisan Models, Contractionary Monetary Policies, Phillips 
Curve, Stationarity Test, Unit Root Test. 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The social and institutional processes through which, the allocation of resources and the direction and trend of 
public finance have become an area in economics which economists have begun researching into. To them these 
activities are often being influenced by certain social and political elites either exclusively for their own benefit 
or for the benefit of people or both. 
Ghana, since independence have experienced military and civil rule interchangeably until in 1992 where it 
begun to experience constitutional and civil governance. The constitution is such that a particular government 
who wins an election governs the entire country for a period of four years after which fresh elections are 
conducted of which the ruling government would contest. Registered political parties may be eligible to contest 
in every general election period provided they satisfy the conditions laid by the Electoral Commission and that of 
the country. However the sitting president could be re-elected by its party to contest in the next general election 
but for not more than two consecutive terms (8 years). There has been remarkable achievement through political 
competition and leadership. Though the parties that have won elections often have majority representation in 
parliament, such representations do not exceed two-thirds of the total representation in parliament. Ghana’s 
burgeoning democracy and elections have often been associated with economic reforms, policies and 
liberalization. 
Efforts are often made to restore growth and have concentrated mostly on macroeconomic reforms and 
stability with particular emphasis on reducing inflation budget deficit, exchange rates, external debt and etc. in 
many instances these policies and reforms are often accompanied by restrictions on consumption and public 
sector employment, removal of subsidies. These reforms and policies often lead to promising results with 
increases in real growth. However these macroeconomic indicators as well as policies are often left to deteriorate 
during election periods.  
Governments have allowed the structure of economic policy making to be influenced by electoral and 
partisan incentives. The directions of economic policies as well as expenditures are often distorted during 
election periods. Government and incumbents seeking re-election use all forms of incentives to entice voters in 
order to win elections. They have become aware that voters are not myopic but discerning and that they may 
evaluate candidates on their aggregate performance or recent experience and on party terms. These often results 
in expenditures and halting of policies that results in cycles of economic expansion and contraction that affect 
the economic wellbeing of the people. In an attempt to win government popularity the populist tendencies of 
incumbent government are brought to bear.  
 
1.2 Statement of the problem 
The effect of political influence on public policy decision has been a central issue in the “public choice” 
literature and the recent being macroeconomic issues. Incumbent government often responds to approaching 
elections by increasing real outlays. Increase in transfers, subsidies and other components of government are 
often due to the desire of politicians to expand output and generate political support in pre-election period. 
Governments tend to alter the composition of government budget so as to capture electoral gains, thus 
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government spending has been sensitive to the electoral cycle. These have often led to unfair distribution of 
resources and increase in public debts. The central question is whether economic reforms and political reforms 
are intertwined or oppositions. Political economists have been able to incorporate democratic policymakers’ 
electoral and partisan motivation into theoretical models of the strength, nature and timing of economic 
policymaking but empirical research and evidence are very limited. This research therefore, seeks to test for the 
existence of politico economic cycles in Ghana and its effects on the economic wellbeing of the people. This 
research therefore, seeks to determine the effect of growth on pre-election probabilities and to find out whether 
politico-economic cycles exist in Ghana.  
This research will enable politicians to realize the need to address policy issues rather than using money and 
incumbency to win votes as voters are becoming more discerning. It will enable governments to take a critical 
look at their expenditure patterns during election periods as it may affect the economic gains achieved. The 
findings and conclusions will serve as an empirical evidence for the case of Ghana as a developing country for 
researchers. It will add to the existing knowledge in the area of macroeconomics, development economics and 
political economics. It will also serve as a basis for further studies. 
 
2.1 Theoretical Literature 
There are two types of models that are often used to explain political business cycles; the “opportunistic models 
and the ‘partisan models’.  
The opportunistic political business cycles are explained by expansions in economic activities caused by an 
opportunistic incumbent government before an election which are meant to increase the chances of being re-
elected. This model was developed by Nordhaus (1975) which suggest that voters have a distribution of 
preferences that depends on inflation and unemployment. According to Nordhaus (1975) unemployment and 
inflation fall smoothly in the period leading to election (since it is best to reduce these variables at the end of the 
cycle, so as to exert the maximum impacts on voters), and rises sharply after the electoral outcome. 
Assuming that the unemployment rate is inversely related to the level of Aggregate demand, the prediction 
of the model is that the incumbent would increase government spending ( and therefore Aggregate demand ) and 
monetary expansion in the period leading to the election in order to exploit the short term Phillips curve (the 
inverse relationship between inflation and unemployment). A contraction in government spending will occur so 
as to reduce inflation, a policy which at the same time leads to recession and high unemployment.  
The levels of monetary expansion and unemployment are those which maximize voter’s satisfaction in the 
election period. In the next election cycle, the same behavior is repeated, with contractionary monetary policy to 
bring down inflation during the periods leading to elections and expansion in spending and money supply during 
election periods. Hence, the possibility of influencing the probability of re-election, combined with the structure 
of the economy yields a cycle in economic activity. The political cycle thus induces a cycle in economic activity 
and inflation (Allan Drazen). Though the incentive for opportunistic policy makers to manipulate policy and 
macro economic cycle may result a number of conceptual and empirical objections maybe raised.  
First, voters are discerning and may realize that ‘election-year economics’ maybe used to influence their 
votes hence may be skeptical of an economic upturn in the months before an election. More formally, their 
expectations of inflation should take the possibility of an election year monetary expansion into accounts. An 
intermediate view is that, voters have less than perfect information about the causes of economic fluctuations and 
take good economic performance as indicating incumbent competence. 
Secondly, incumbent governments running for elections may not have direct control on their central banks 
and hence control over monetary policy as in some countries. However there has been evidence that such 
independent central banks turn to accommodate pressures for monetary expansion during periods leading to 
elections in order to prevent sharp movement of interest rates (Wooldey, 1984).  
In partisan models, political business cycles are induced by the differences among political parties and their 
ideology and economic goals. This model is due to Hibbs (1977), based on different preferences over inflation 
and unemployment across parties. Instead of the cycles of pre-elections expansions and post elections 
contractions as explained by the “opportunistic model, the partisan model predicts that unemployment be 
permanently lower and inflation permanently higher during the terms of left-wing government as compared with 
right–wing governments. 
The partisan model however suggests that the effects will be temporary post-election effects in either case, 
after which outcomes are the same regardless of party in power (Allan Drazen). Given this characterization of 
the election describe above it is pertinent to indicate that such partisan model do not exist in Ghana and therefore 
our study on political business cycle theory for Ghana is the opportunistic. 
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2.2 Empirical Studies 
The role of political factors in economic cycle in developing countries has been the focus of recent attention. 
Haggard (1991), Haggard and Kaufman (1990) have shown (before Pinochet) patterns of inflation and to be 
correlated with political events which erodes macroeconomic management. According to Dornbusch and de 
Pablo (1989) failure to stabilize in the face of endemic inflation in Argentina has gone hand in hand with 
continued political polarization and instability and the failure of any group to consolidate its power effectively. 
Roubini (1991) however, have indicated that budget deficits are rather the cause of political instability rather 
than the effects of elections. Whitehead (1990) has argued that central government’s spending follows cyclical 
pattern - rising in the first budget of a new president, falling for the next couple of years and then rising again in 
the rush to complete projects before the term’s end. Ames (1987) provides some evidence for the assumptions 
that governments tend to alter the composition of government spending so as to capture electoral gains. Karnik 
(1990) provides econometric results supporting the assumption that government spending in India has been 
sensitive to electoral cycle. 
The evidence for political business cycle in outcomes is quite mixed with most studies finding little 
evidence of opportunities political cycles especially in developed countries (Alesina et al, 1993; Drazen 2000). 
Brender and Drazen (2005) confirm the insignificant effect of growth on re- election probabilities in developed 
countries in large cross- section study of a sample of 74 countries. OLS regressions in Ito and Park (1988) and 
Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini (1992) were not able to find evidence of a political monetary cycle in Japan whilst 
a panel regression in Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini (1993) also rejects a political cycle for OECD countries using 
monetary base. 
 
3.1 The Theoretical Model 
In developing the method for the estimation of the opportunistic political business cycle the following questions, 
which are key, are raised: Do voters respond to favorable macroeconomic indicators during election periods? Do 
election period leads to economic expansion? 
Political business cycle models are tested by estimating the equation: 
  
Where , is the cyclical variable, , the control variables, , the election variable (proximate by a 
dummy) and , the error term. The election dummy is expected to mark the timing of the cycle. It is defined as 
“1” in the pre-election period and “0” in the post election period. This is in consonance with Nordhaus (1975), 
which seeks peaks (or trough) in the cycles at the time of election. 
Single-period comparisons are typical in testing (Nordhaus, 1975; Ito and Park, 1998; Heckelman and 
Whaples 1996), but alternative specifications are also considered for early strategic behavior and lags from 
policy effect adjustments (Heckelman and Berument, 1998). 
Most researches on political business cycles have relied on the assumption that the macroeconomic 
variables are generated by a co-variance stationary process that can be estimated by a finite autoregressive 
regression. 
 
3.2 The Empirical Model 
The general model to be estimated is as follows; 
  
It must be noted that the controlled macroeconomic variables achieved stationarity at the first difference hence 
the specific model to be estimated is: 
 
Where is the real GDP, , is the annual inflation, is the foreign debt, , is the 
money supply, , being government expenditure, elections (proximate by a dummy), election period 
and et, being the error term. 
Data was collected from the Ghana Statistical Service, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and the 
Bank of Ghana, for the period 1992-2010 during which Ghana has had an uninterrupted democratic elections 
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4.1 Analysis and Presentation of Results 
Time Series Regression Analysis 
Dependent Variable: GDP   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 11/05/12   Time: 11:50   
Sample: 1992 2010   
Included observations: 19   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ELECTIONS 1791.919 1729.672 1.035988 0.3178 
EXTDEBT 0.191712 0.042504 4.510473 0.0005 
GOVTEXP 0.165555 0.229452 0.721522 0.4825 
INFLATION 33.89121 77.18629 0.439083 0.6673 
M1 0.641712 0.503253 1.275126 0.2230 
     
     R-squared 0.612875     Mean dependent var 16830.42 
Adjusted R-squared 0.490839     S.D. dependent var 3099.092 
S.E. of regression 3707.062     Akaike info criterion 19.49480 
Sum squared resid 1.92E+08     Schwarz criterion 19.74334 
Log likelihood 180.2006     Hannan-Quinn criter. 19.53686 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.004179    
     
     
 
4.2 Conclusion and Recommendations 
In countries where political systems produce single-party governance, election timing and activities has become 
an ideal weapon for enticing voters to vote in their favor. The opportunistic political business cycles suggest that 
incumbent governments often leave policies and programme to deteriorate with no party discipline during 
election periods leading to unfavorable political business cycles. Researchers of political cycles have found 
mixed conclusions to this assertion as some findings lend support to, whilst others have found political business 
cycles not to exist. 
Our findings, based on 1992-2010 data suggest that political business cycles do not exist in Ghana. Our 
findings therefore support the views of (Ito and Park, 1999; Alesina et al, 1992, 1993; Brender and Drazen, 
2005). Though political cycles do not exist in Ghana, politicians and political economists should however, 
recognize the opportunities to explore the electoral and partisan incentives for policy making so as to deepen 
democracy and increase economic growth and development in pre-election, election and election periods by 
smoothening and sustaining favorable economic policies. 
Though political cycles do not exist nonetheless, pre-election manipulations of some sort is a common 
phenomenon as its manifestation becomes glare as abuse of incumbency is noticed though data do not suggest so. 
The implication is that abuse of incumbency may exist but not to the extent that creates political cycles  
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Table 1: Unit Root Test for External Debt 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(EXTDEBT) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=3) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.474731  0.0031 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.886751  
 5% level  -3.052169  
 10% level  -2.666593  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 17 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(EXTDEBT,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 11/05/12   Time: 11:33   
Sample (adjusted): 1994 2010   
Included observations: 17 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(EXTDEBT(-1)) -1.165545 0.260473 -4.474731 0.0004 
C 1088.971 3220.547 0.338132 0.7399 
     
     R-squared 0.571713     Mean dependent var 426.9412 
Adjusted R-squared 0.543160     S.D. dependent var 19625.17 
S.E. of regression 13264.64     Akaike info criterion 21.93372 
Sum squared resid 2.64E+09     Schwarz criterion 22.03175 
Log likelihood -184.4366     Hannan-Quinn criter. 21.94347 
F-statistic 20.02322     Durbin-Watson stat 1.894679 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000445    
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Table 2: Unit Root Test for Government Expenditure 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(GOVTEXP,2) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=3) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -7.079958  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.920350  
 5% level  -3.065585  
 10% level  -2.673459  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 16 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(GOVTEXP,3)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 11/05/12   Time: 11:39   
Sample (adjusted): 1995 2010   
Included observations: 16 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(GOVTEXP(-1),2) -1.966204 0.277714 -7.079958 0.0000 
C 2196.702 1889.476 1.162598 0.2644 
     
     R-squared 0.781679     Mean dependent var 1787.388 
Adjusted R-squared 0.766085     S.D. dependent var 15619.56 
S.E. of regression 7554.366     Akaike info criterion 20.81411 
Sum squared resid 7.99E+08     Schwarz criterion 20.91068 
Log likelihood -164.5129     Hannan-Quinn criter. 20.81905 
F-statistic 50.12581     Durbin-Watson stat 2.243000 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000006    
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Table 3: Unit Root Test for Inflation 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(INFLATION) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 3 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=3) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -5.779273  0.0005 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.004425  
 5% level  -3.098896  
 10% level  -2.690439  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 14 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(INFLATION,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 11/05/12   Time: 11:41   
Sample (adjusted): 1997 2010   
Included observations: 14 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(INFLATION(-1)) -2.832094 0.490043 -5.779273 0.0003 
D(INFLATION(-1),2) 1.264971 0.334540 3.781219 0.0043 
D(INFLATION(-2),2) 0.879820 0.256410 3.431302 0.0075 
D(INFLATION(-3),2) 0.473678 0.154513 3.065624 0.0134 
C -4.867959 2.234601 -2.178446 0.0573 
     
     R-squared 0.840679     Mean dependent var 0.100000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.769870     S.D. dependent var 16.39667 
S.E. of regression 7.865795     Akaike info criterion 7.235377 
Sum squared resid 556.8366     Schwarz criterion 7.463612 
Log likelihood -45.64764     Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.214250 
F-statistic 11.87243     Durbin-Watson stat 2.505857 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001230    
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Table 4: Unit Root Test for Money Supply 
Null Hypothesis: D(M1,2) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=3) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.480868  0.0231 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.920350  
 5% level  -3.065585  
 10% level  -2.673459  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 16 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(M1,3)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 11/05/12   Time: 11:43   
Sample (adjusted): 1995 2010   
Included observations: 16 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(M1(-1),2) -0.942111 0.270654 -3.480868 0.0037 
C 409.0784 319.5157 1.280308 0.2212 
     
     R-squared 0.463939     Mean dependent var -26.55137 
Adjusted R-squared 0.425649     S.D. dependent var 1551.665 
S.E. of regression 1175.944     Akaike info criterion 17.09400 
Sum squared resid 19359826     Schwarz criterion 17.19057 
Log likelihood -134.7520     Hannan-Quinn criter. 17.09894 
F-statistic 12.11644     Durbin-Watson stat 1.937602 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.003672    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
